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Countries’ Survival in Networked International Environments
Yuke Li, A. Stephen Morse, Ji Liu, and Tamer Bas¸ar
Abstract— This paper applies a recently developed power
allocation game in [1] to study the countries’ survival problem
in networked international environments. In the game, countries
strategically allocate their power to support the survival of
themselves and their friends and to oppose that of their foes,
where by a country’s survival is meant when the country’s total
support equals or exceeds its total threats. This paper estab-
lishes conditions that characterize different types of networked
international environments in which a country may survive,
such as when all the antagonism among countries makes up a
complete or bipartite graph.
Index Terms— survival, countries, power, allocation, net-
works
I. INTRODUCTION
In a recent paper [1], a power allocation game (the
PAG, hereafter) on networks has been studied to understand
countries’ strategic behaviors in international environments.
In the game, countries allocate their resources, i.e., deploying
their total power, to their friends and foes in order to pursue
certain goals, such as protecting the survival of their friends
and themselves while opposing that of their foes. In [1], the
framework of the power allocation game, which is an infinite,
resource-allocation game on graphs, is introduced, and the
existence of a pure strategy Nash equilibrium is established.
A question both immediate from studying countries’
power allocation in [1] and meaningful from a decision
making perspective is this: can a country always survive
when it allocates its power in a complex, networked inter-
national environment? This question is motivated by a well-
accepted assumption in international relations theory that for
a country, its survival is a fundamental objective that needs to
be pursued on an everyday basis. For instance, according to
John Mearsheimer, a representative of the school of thought
termed as “offensive realism” which generally studies the
scenarios in which countries are aggressive and even expan-
sionist, countries are seeking nothing more than their own
security and survival at a minimum [2] (similar discussions
can also be found in [3] and [4]).
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The studies of countries’ survivability in complex interna-
tional environments necessarily fall into the broad category
of the studies of military strategies, which can be dated to the
work of Sun Tzu [5] and Carl von Clausewitz [6]. In terms
of the famous examples of contemporary scholarship on
military strategies, Jack L Snyder’s Rand Report for the US
Air Force entitled “The Soviet strategic culture: Implications
for limited nuclear operations” [7] explores several factors –
historical, institutional, and political – that are conducive to
a uniquely Soviet approach to strategic thought, and [8]–
[13] focuses more on the American approach. In addition,
the work of [14]–[16] gives a more general treatment of
military strategies. Outside of academia, [17] and [18] are
two studies published within the American military system,
with the former developing a theory of “power control”
and the latter overviewing some major concepts underlying
the study of military strategy (e.g., national power, national
interests, strategic risk and strategic art). In particular, [16]
is representative of a line of work that applies game theory
to explore a list of survival-related issues, including the
strategies to force the other side into compliance and the
limits of manipulating those strategies (e.g., “brinkmanship”
by [19], “the spiral model” by [20] and [21], and “the
deterrence model” by [21]–[28]).
However, none of the above works have explored coun-
tries’ survivability within a networked international envi-
ronment. This paper will take a preliminary step towards
applying the ideas recently developed in [1] to study this
military strategy and national policy of managing the mili-
tary resources; i.e., the “power allocation strategies”, in the
context of a networked international environment and the
implications of this environment for countries’ survival.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows.
The theoretical framework of the PAG on networks in [1]
will first be reviewed in Section II. Then, Section III will
explore two questions: First, what could be the possible
environments in which countries can survive when they have
friends? Second, what could be the possible environments in
which they can survive when they do not have friends? As
will be discussed, some results in Section III characterize
the game environments for a given country to survive in
at least one equilibrium (class) of the game; i.e., it has
any possibility of survival, while other results characterize
the game environments for the country to survive in all
equilibrium (classes); i.e., it can absolutely survive. Lastly,
the environments for uniquely predicting about countries’
survival will be discussed in Section IV.
II. THE POWER ALLOCATION GAME
In this section, the PAG proposed in [1] is briefly reviewed,
beginning with the definitions of the elements that constitute
both the environment in which the PAG it is played and then
the PAG itself. In a networked international environment,
there is a collection C of n countries, labeled 1, 2, . . . , n;
let the set of country labels be n = {1, 2, . . . , n}. The total
power of all n countries is defined as a real, nonnegative
valued row vector p = [pi]1×n, where pi is country i’s total
power.
Any two countries in C can be said to have a relation. A
relation is technically speaking a binary relation defined on
C, which takes one of the following four possibilities: with
itself, each country i can be said to have a self relation; with
any other country j in C, each country i can have a friend, an
adversary or a null relation. The binary relation is reflexive;
in addition, assume that it is symmetric; e.g., if j is a friend
of i, then i is a friend of j and similarly if j is an adversary
of i then i is an adversary of j, and that it is not transitive.
Based on this binary relation, country i has a subset of
countries in C with labels in Fi ⊂ n called its friends, a
subset of countries in C with labels in Ai ⊂ n called its
adversaries, and the set of countries in C with labels in n−
{i}∪Ai∪Fi i has null relations with; i.e., having no specific
relations with. For each i ∈ n, {i},Fi, Ai are disjoint.
The unordered pair {i, j} stands for a pair of distinct labels
in n such that i and j have a relation. Denote the set of all
friendly pairs as Rf and the set of all adversarial pairs as
Ra. Suppose the number of pairs in Rf ∪Ra is m. A map
η : Rf ∪Ra → m where m = {1, 2, ...,m} determines for
each element in Rf ∪Ra a distinct label in the set m.
Country i’s power allocation strategy is a real, nonnegative
valued row vector ui ∈ R
1×n whose j-th entry is uij . If
j ∈ Fi, then uij represents the portion of country i’s total
power which country i is willing to commit to the support or
defense of friend j against friend j’s adversaries. If j ∈ Ai,
then uij is the portion of country i’s total power that it is
committing to its possible offense actions against country j.
If j ∈ {i}, uii is the portion of country i’s total power it
holds in reserve. Finally, if n−{i}∪Ai∪Fi, uij represents
the portion of country i’s total power committing to j which
i has no specific relation with, and we stipulate that uij = 0.
Accordingly, for each i ∈ n,
∑n
j=1 uij = pi so the i-th row
sum of the power allocation matrix U = [uij ]n×n is pi. U
denotes the set of all admissible strategy matrices.
For each country i ∈ n, there are two types of
nonnegative-valued functions on U . The first, called a sup-
port function for agent i, is the map σi: U → [0,∞),
U 7−→ uii +
∑
j∈Fi
uji +
∑
j∈Ai
uij
Here
∑
j∈Fi
uji is the total amount of power the friends of
country i commit to country i’s defense and
∑
j∈Ai
uij is
the total amount of power country i commits to its possible
offenses against all of its adversaries. The second function,
called a threat function for country i, is the map τi : U →
[0,∞),
U 7−→
∑
j∈Ai
uji
Thus τi(U) is the total power of all of country i’s adversaries
commit to their respective offenses against country i.
As a consequence of specific allocations, each country i
may find itself in one of three possible states, namely a safe
state, a precarious state, or an unsafe state. A country is
said to survive if it is in the safe or precarious state. Let
xi : U → {safe, precarious, unsafe} denote the map
U 7−→


safe if σi(U) > τi(U)
precarious if σi(U) = τi(U)
unsafe if σi(U) < τi(U)
xi(U) is called the state of country i induced by power
allocation matrix U ∈ U . More generally, by the state of the
overall collection of countries C induced by power allocation
matrix U is meant the row vector x(U) = [xi(U)]1×n. The
state space of C is thus the finite set X = {x(U) : U ∈ U}
whose cardinality is at most 3n.
In the sequel, two axioms are proposed to construct a
rationale for countries to choose their own power allocation
strategies in a game-theoretic context, which are based on the
states of themselves, their friends and adversaries induced
by the power allocation matrices. The axioms will model
their preferences for all possible strategy combinations of all
countries; i.e., the power allocation matrices in U .
“Preference” is a terminology commonly used in the social
sciences to describe agents’ ordering of alternatives; take
two arbitrary power allocation matrices U and V , country i
may have a strong preference relation, e.g.,“strongly prefer”1
V to U (written as U ≺ V ), a weak preference relation,
e.g., “weakly prefer” V to U (written as U  V ), or an
indifference relation, i.e., are indifferent between the two
(written as U ∼ V ).
It is natural to presume that any country i cares positively
about the survival of its friends and itself, negatively about
the survival of its adversaries, and indifferently about the
survival of those countries with whom it has no relations.
These observations motivate Axiom 1:
Axiom 1 (Multi-Front Survival Issue):
1. Country i weakly prefers strategy matrix V over U if
the following two conditions both hold:
1In many other contexts, it is also termed as “strictly prefer”.
a) (xj(V ) ∈ {safe, precarious}) or (xj(U) = unsafe)
or both, ∀j ∈ {i} ∪ Fi
2.
b) (xj(V ) ∈ {unsafe, precarious}) or (xj(U) = safe)
or both, ∀j ∈ Ai.
As is standard, weak preference of V over U is denoted by
V  U or by U  V .
2. Country i is indifferent to the choice between strategy
matrices V and U if
xj(U) = xj(V ), ∀j ∈ {i} ∪ Ai ∪ Fi.
Indifference between U and V is denoted by U ∼ V .
A direct implication of Axiom 1 is that country i weakly
prefers V over U if country j’s states3 induced by U and
V satisfy one of the three respective conditions above, while
all else is equal (i.e., the states of all (other) countries i has
a relation with are the same under U and V ).
It is also natural to assume that countries prioritize self-
survival. This motivates Axiom 2:
Axiom 2 (Priority of Self-Survival): Country i strongly
prefers strategy matrix V over U if
(xi(V ) ∈ {safe, precarious}) and (xi(U) = unsafe).4
Strong preference of V over U is denoted by V ≺ U or by
U ≺ V .
The two axioms determine a partial order of the states
in X . An additional assumption about ad-hoc and country-
specific attributes such as degrees of affinity with different
friends (e.g., captured by cultural, trading, linguistic con-
nections) is both necessary and sufficient for extending this
partial order into a total order; a discussion of why this
is so will appear in another paper. Moreover, Axiom 2
makes this partial order a “lexicographic order”, with the
further implication being that a continuous, real-valued utility
function representation of the preference order of the states
in X is impossible (see the discussion in [29]).
The PAG in a networked international environment is
the collection of all the aforementioned elements, Γ =
{C, p,U , σi, τi,X ,}.
For illustrative purpose, an edge-colored, undirected and
unweighted graph on n vertices andm edges,GE = (V , EE),
is the “environment graph” of the PAG. An environment
graph represents n countries with their total power labeled
besides each of the n vertices, m pairs of which have a
friend or adversary relation (n,m ∈ Z). In GE , two nodes
vi and vj , which denote two countries i and j with a friend
or adversary relation, are connected by an undirected edge
2For convenience, it can equivalently be written as (xj(V ) ∈
{safe, precarious}) ∨ (xj(U) = unsafe), ∀j ∈ {i} ∪ Fi.
3j may or may not have a relation with i.
4Similarly, it can be equivalently written as (xi(V ) ∈
{safe, precarious}) ∧ (xi(U) = unsafe).
{vi, vj}, colored green if i and j are friends and red if i and
j are adversaries.
An edge-colored, directed and weighted graph on n ver-
tices and 2m edges, GA = (V , EA), is the “allocation
graph” of the PAG. An allocation graph represents the power
allocation of countries in this environment; i.e., a power
allocation matrix. In GA, two nodes vi and vj , which denote
two countries i and j with a friend or adversary relation,
are connected by two directed edges (vi, vj) and (vj , vi),
colored green if i and j are friends and red if i and j are
adversaries. The edge weight of (vi, vj) is uij , and the node
weight of i is uii. Neither GE nor GA has to be connected.
When they are unconnected, the PAGs on those connected
components can be regarded as being unrelated.
The Nash equilibrium concept is naturally employed to
make predictions for the PAG. Let country i’s deviation from
the power allocation matrix U be a nonnegative-valued 1×n
row vector di ∈ R
1×n such that ui + di is a valid strategy
that satisfies the total power constraint for country i. The
deviation set δi(U) is the set of all possible deviations of
country i from the power allocation matrix U . In the context
of a PAG, a power allocation matrix U is a pure strategy
Nash Equilibrium if no unilateral deviation in strategy by
any single country i is profitable for i, that is,
U + eidi  U, for all di ∈ δi(U),
where ei is an n × 1 unit vector whose elements are 0 but
the i-th coordinate which is 1.
Denote the set of pure strategy Nash equilibria as U∗.
An equivalence relation can be defined on U∗ such that
U∗ is equivalent to V ∗ if and only if x(U∗) = x(V ∗).
Let [U∗]x(U∗) be the equilibrium equivalence class of U
∗ ∈
U∗. Obviously, the total number of equilibrium equivalence
classes is at most 3n, and their union is U∗.
It has been established in [1] that the PAG Γ =
{C, p,U , σi, τi,X ,} always has a pure strategy Nash equi-
librium.
III. COUNTRIES’ SURVIVAL
This section explores the conditions for countries’ survival,
by discussing the first case in which they have friends in the
environment, and then the second one in which they do not.
A. Survival with Friends
This section shows that a country’s friends’ outside obli-
gations may tremendously affect its survival.
Example 1: The networked environment in which the PAG
takes place is characterized by the following parameters:
1) Set of countries (labels): n = {1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6}.
2) Countries’ total power: p = [p1, p2, p3, p4, p5, p6] =
[19, 3, 6, 15, 3, 9].
3) Countries’ relations: A1 = {4}, A2 = {5}, A3 = {6},
F2 = {3}, F4 = {5}, and all other possible pairs of
countries have no relations.
4) Countries’ preferences: Assume the two axioms.
v1
19
v2
3
v3
6
v4
15
v5
3
v6
9
(a) Environment
v1
0
v2
0
v3
0
v4
0
v5
0
v6
0
00
6
9
3
3
19
15
00
(b) Allocation
Fig. 1: Friends’ Outside Commitments
Figure 3a illustrates a two-sided conflict, where countries
from one side are either adversaries or not having specific
relations with countries from the other side. Figure 3b shows
the (only) equilibrium of the corresponding PAG where
neither country 3 nor country 4 benefits from its friend
relation – their friends, country 2 and country 4 respectively,
have to use all of their power for protecting themselves.
Therefore, it is always necessary to consider a country’s
friends’ own power and relations in order to understand to
what extent the power of the friends are actually available
for supporting itself.
This example motivates two solutions to the ineffective-
ness of alliances by which countries may achieve survival in
any equilibrium of the PAG, formalized in Theorems 1 and
2, respectively.
The following result establishes a sufficient condition
under which a group of countries can survive, assuming they
are not adversarial with each other.
Theorem 1: In the PAG Γ = {C, p,U , σi, τi,X ,}, a
nonempty set of countries n0 ⊂ n with no adversary relation
among them will survive in any Nash equilibrium if for each
of them, its total power is no smaller than that of all its
adversaries. In other words, if for each i ∈ n0, there holds
Ai
⋂
n0 = ∅, pi ≥
∑
j∈Ai
pj ,
then σi(U
∗) ≥ τi(U∗) for all i ∈ n0 and U∗ ∈ U∗.
It is worth noting that Theorem 1 holds regardless of
whether the countries in n0 have friends or not.
Proof: Let U∗ ∈ U∗. Consider an arbitrary country i ∈
n. We consider two cases σi(U
∗) < pi and σi(U
∗) ≥ pi,
separately.
First, suppose that σi(U
∗) < pi. We claim that σi(U
∗) ≥
τi(U
∗). To establish the claim, suppose that, to the contrary,
σi(U
∗) < τi(U
∗). Since σi(U
∗) < pi, it implies that country
i allocates its power to support its friend(s) while being
unsafe itself, which contradicts Axiom 2. Thus, σi(U
∗) ≥
τi(U
∗), i.e., country i can survive in this case.
Next, suppose that σi(U
∗) ≥ pi. Since country i’s adver-
saries are not in the set n0, it follows that∑
j∈Ai
pj ≥ τi(U
∗).
Since country i’s total power is no smaller than that of all
its adversaries, it follows that
σi(U
∗) ≥ pi ≥
∑
j∈Ai
pj ≥ τi(U
∗),
which implies that country i can also survive in this case.
The next theorem treats another scenario in which the
group of countries considered are friends with each other.
Theorem 2: In the PAG Γ = {C, p,U , σi, τi,X ,}, a
nonempty set of countries n0 ⊂ n will survive in any Nash
equilibrium if they are friends with one another and their
total power is no smaller than that of their adversaries. In
other words, if
j ∈ Fi, for all i, j ∈ n0,
and ∑
i∈n0
pi ≥
∑
j∈An0
pj, where An0 =
⋃
i∈n0
Ai,
then σi(U
∗) ≥ τi(U∗) for all i ∈ n and U∗ ∈ U∗.
Proof: Let U∗ be any Nash equilibrium in U∗. To prove
that all countries in n0 can survive at U
∗ (i.e., σk(U
∗) ≥
τk(U
∗) for all k ∈ n0), suppose that, to the contrary, there
exists at least one country that is unsafe. Let E be the set of
those unsafe countries. That is, σi(U
∗) < τi(U
∗) for each
i ∈ E . It is clear that E ⊂ n0. Since the total power of
countries in n0 is no smaller than that of their adversaries,
it is impossible that all countries in n0 are unsafe. Thus, E
must be a proper subset of n0, which implies that n0 \ E is
nonempty.
Since ∑
i∈n0
pi ≥
∑
j∈An0
pj ,
it follows that∑
i∈n0\E
pi +
∑
i∈E
pi ≥
∑
j∈An0\AE
pk +
∑
j∈AE
pj ,
where
AE =
⋃
i∈E
Ai.
Rearranging the terms of the above inequality, we have∑
i∈n0\E
pi −
∑
j∈An0\AE
pk ≥
∑
j∈AE
pj −
∑
i∈E
pi.
Since the amount of threats from a country’s (or a set of
countries’) adversaries against the country (or the set of
countries) cannot exceed its (or their) total power, it follows
that
∑
j∈AE
pj −
∑
i∈E
pi ≥
∑
i∈E
(τi(U
∗)− σi(U
∗)) .
Then, the friends of the countries in E can deviate by
transferring at most
∑
i∈E(τi(U
∗) − σi(U∗)) amount of
power for supporting the countries in E to avoid being unsafe,
without becoming unsafe themselves. This contradicts the
fact that U∗ is a Nash equilibrium. Thus, all countries in n0
survive at U∗.
B. Survival without Friends
Countries’ survival issue in environments where no coun-
tries have any friends will now be examined; specifically, two
possible networked environments will be discussed, with the
first being where the adversary relations constitute a complete
graph, and the second being where the adversary relations
constitute a bipartite graph.
Example 2: The networked environment in which the PAG
takes place is characterized by the following parameters:
1) Set of countries (labels): n = {1, 2, 3}
2) Countries’ total power: p = [p1, p2, p3] = [8, 6, 4].
3) Countries’ relations: Ai = n \ {i}, i ∈ n
4) Countries’ preferences: Assume the two axioms.
v1 8
v2
6
v3
4
(a) Environment
v1 2
v2
0
v3
0
2
0
4
4
4
2
(b) Allocation I
v1 0
v2
0
v3
0
4
4
1
0
4
5
(c) Allocation II
v1 0
v2
0
v3
0
2
3
0
1
6
6
(d) Allocation III
Fig. 2: Unique Survivor in Each Outcome
This example shows three equilibrium outcomes,
each of which has respectively country 1, 2 and 3 as
the only survivor. These three equilibrium outcomes
are [safe, unsafe, unsafe], [unsafe, safe, unsafe], and
[unsafe, unsafe, safe]. Obviously, other countries than the
survivor have exhausted all their power in the antagonism
with their (other) adversaries.
Motivated by the above example, Theorem 3 provides a
sufficient condition for the existence of a Nash equilibrium in
the PAG where only a country can survive in an environment
where no country has any friend and, in particular, every
country is adversary with one another. To prove this theorem,
the following concept more extensively discussed in [30] will
be used:
A Nash equilibrium of the PAG, U∗ ∈ U∗, is called a
balancing equilibrium if at the equilibrium, every country
has to use all its power only on offending its foes, and every
country’s offense toward every foe is just equal to the offense
received from the foe; consequently, every country’s total
support just balances out its total threats. That is, for all
i ∈ n, there holds u∗ij = u
∗
ji, j ∈ Ai and
∑
j∈Ai
u∗ij = pi.
Therefore, σi(U
∗) = τi(U
∗)(or xi(U
∗) = precarious).
The following lemma (the proof of which is in [30])
provides a condition for the existence of a “balancing equi-
librium”.
Lemma 1: In the PAG Γ = {C, p,U , σi, τi,X ,} with at
least three countries, and all of the countries are adversaries
with each other, 5 a balancing equilibrium exists if and only if
each country’s power is no greater than the total power of its
adversaries. In other words, suppose i ∈ n and Ai = n\{i}.
A balancing equilibrium U∗ ∈ U∗ at which
∀i ∈ n, uii = 0;
∀i ∈ n, j ∈ Ai, uij = uji; and
∑
j∈Ai
uij = pi
exists if and only if
∀i ∈ n, pi ≤
∑
j∈Ai
pj.
Theorem 3: In the PAG Γ = {C, p,U , σi, τi,X ,}, if all
of the countries are adversaries with each other6 and each
country’s power is strictly less than the total power of all
its adversaries, there exists a Nash equilibrium at which a
country and only this country can survive (and only this
country is safe.) In other words, if for all i ∈ n, there holds
Ai = n \ {i} and pi <
∑
j∈Ai
pj ,
then there exists a Nash equilibrium U∗ ∈ U∗ at which
σi0(U
∗) > τi0(U
∗) and σj(U
∗) < τj(U
∗) for all j ∈
n \ {i0}, i0 ∈ n
Proof: Given an arbitrary country i in n, the set of
adversarial pairs except for those involving i is denoted as
RA\Ai. Note thatRA\Ai still make up a complete subgraph
of G, G′ = {n \ {i}, E ′}.
1) If there exists a country j in the subgraph G′, that is,
j ∈ n \ {i}, such that its power is no smaller than that
5Lemma 1 also holds in the trivial case when there are only two
countries.
6That is, adversary relations constitute a complete graph.
of all other countries (i.e., its adversaries) combined in
the subgraph,
pj >
∑
k∈Aj\{i}
pk.
In this case, a pure strategy Nash equilibrium U∗ in
which only i survives and is safe, i.e., σi(U
∗) >
τi(U
∗), can be constructed.
The construction proceeds with two steps. First, let
country j allocate enough to make all of its adversaries
other than i unsafe. Technically speaking, construct an
U ′ = [ujk](n−1)×(n−1) where there holds
∀k ∈ Aj \ {i}, ujk > pk
and ∑
h∈Ak\{i}
ukh = pk
Second, let country i allocate enough to make j unsafe.
Technically speaking, construct an U = [uij ]n×n by
expanding U ′ to incorporate the allocations between i
and countries in n\{i}. Let uij > pj−
∑
k∈Aj\{i}
ujk.
This is feasible because, as assumed, pi <
∑
j∈Ai
.
Then
pj − pi ≤
∑
k∈Aj\{i}
pk ≤
∑
k∈Aj\{i}
ujk
Rearranging terms,
pi ≥ pj −
∑
k∈Aj\{i}
ujk.
Then a pure strategy equilibrium has been derived such
that σi(U
∗) > τi(U
∗) and σj(U
∗) < τj(U
∗) for all
j ∈ n \ {i}.
2) If there does not exist a country in G′ such that its
power exceeds all other countries in G′. By lemma 1,
a balancing equilibrium U ′ exists for the PAG of the
n− 1 countries on G′.
Let it be U ′ = [ujk](n−1)×(n−1), where by definition
∀j ∈ n′, ujj = 0; ∀j, k ∈ n
′, ujk = ujk;
∑
k∈Aj\{i}
ujk = pj.
In this case, a pure strategy Nash equilibrium in which
only i survives can be constructed by expanding U ′
to incorporate the allocations between i and countries
in n \ {i}. ∀j ∈ n \ {i}, let uij =
pi
n−1 . Then a
pure strategy equilibrium has been derived such that
σi0(U
∗) > τi0(U
∗) and σj(U
∗) < τj(U
∗) for all
j ∈ n \ {i}.
Theorem 4: In the PAG Γ = {C, p,U , σi, τi,X ,}, if no
country has any friend and all the adversary relations among
the countries constitute a bipartite graph, the necessary
condition for the PAG to have a Nash equilibrium at which
a country not only survives but also is safe is that the power
of any adversary of this country is no greater than the total
power of all its own adversaries (including this country
itself). In other words, in the bipartite environment graph
GE = {V , EE} with the partition of the node set V into L
and R, V = L ∪ R and L ∩ R = ∅. ∀{vi, vj} ∈ EE , either
vi ∈ L and vj ∈ R or vi ∈ R and vj ∈ L. All edges in
EE are colored red because ∀i ∈ n, Fi = ∅. For the PAG
to have a pure strategy Nash equilibrium U∗ in which given
country i, σi(U
∗) > τi(U
∗), there must hold that ∀j ∈ Ai,
pj ≤
∑
k∈Aj
pk,
.
Proof: The contrapositive is that given country i, there
exists an adversary of itself j whose total power exceeds that
of all j’s adversaries.
It follows that
σj(U
∗) ≥ pj >
∑
k∈Aj
pk ≥ τj(U
∗).
which implies that country j is always safe in any equilib-
rium ; consequently, country i is always unsafe or precarious
in any equilibrium.
Equivalently, the necessary condition for the PAG to have
a pure strategy Nash equilibrium U∗ such that σi(U
∗) >
τi(U
∗), which is that ∀j ∈ Ai,
pj ≤
∑
k∈Aj
pk
is thus proven.
The necessary condition stated in Theorem 4 is insufficient
for the proposition to hold (see Example 3), and Theorem 5
states a sufficient condition.
Example 3: The networked environment in which the PAG
takes place is characterized by the following parameters:
1) Set of countries (labels): n = {1, 2, 3, 4}
2) Countries’ total power: p = [p1, p2, p3, p4] =
[4, 5, 6, 5].
3) Countries’ relations: A1 = A2 = {3, 4}, and all the
other pairs have no relations.
4) Countries’ preferences: Assume the two axioms.
This example shows that for country 1 or 2, the total
power of its adversaries, p3 + p4, is smaller than that of
their adversaries, p1 + p2. But neither country 1 nor country
2 will be safe in any equilibrium.
Theorem 5: In the PAG Γ = {C, p,U , σi, τi,X ,}, if
no country has any friend and all the adversary relations
constitute a bipartite graph, a sufficient condition for the
PAG to have a Nash equilibrium in which a country not only
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Fig. 3: Impossibility of Safety for v1 and v2
survives but also is safe is that the power of any adversary
of this country is no greater than the total power of its
own adversaries (which will include this country), and the
total power of these adversaries is no greater than the total
power of the adversaries of themselves. In other words, in the
bipartite environment graphGE = {V , EE} with the partition
of the node set V into L and R, V = L∪R and L∩R = ∅.
∀{vi, vj} ∈ EE , either vi ∈ L and vj ∈ R or vi ∈ R and
vj ∈ L. All edges in EE are colored red because ∀i ∈ n,
Fi = ∅. If for country i, there holds that ∀j ∈ Ai,
pj ≤
∑
k∈Aj
pk
and
∑
i∈Ai
pj <
∑
k∈AAi
pk, where AAi =
⋃
j∈Ai
Aj ,
(simply, the adversaries of i’s adversaries), then the PAG
has a pure strategy Nash equilibrium U∗ in which σi(U
∗) >
τi(U
∗).
A variation of the algorithm used for constructing a pure
strategy Nash equilibrium for the PAG in [1] will be used
for constructing an equilibrium with the above particular
prediction. Specifically, the algorithm is first applied only
on the adversarial pairs without those involving country i,
which proceeds as below:
The Algorithm. Let q be the number of pairs in Ra \
{{i, j}|j ∈ Ai}, and q = {1, 2, ..., q} be the set of distinct
labels for elements in this set. A bijection γ : Ra → q
determines an ordering of the set of the adversarial pairs
except those involving i, Ra \ {{i, j}|j ∈ Ai}, with {j, h}
being the γ({j, h})-th term in the ordering. Let z(k) be the
vector of countries’ remaining power after the k-th recursion,
where zi(k) is the i-th entry in z(k) denoting country i’s
remaining power.
Consider the recursion,
z(k) = z(k − 1)−min{zj(k − 1), zh(k − 1)}(ej + eh)
U(k) = diag{z(k−1)−min{zj(k−1), zh(k−1)}(ej+eh)}+
min{zj(k − 1), zh(k − 1)}(eje
T
h + ehe
T
j )
where k ∈ q, U(k) ∈ Rn×n, U(0) = diag{z(0)} =
diag{z1(0), z2(0), ..., zn(0)}, and {j, h} = γ−1(k).
Update uij(q) = zj(q) + ǫ, j ∈ Ai, subject to i’s total
power constraint,
∑
j∈Ai
zj(q) + ǫ = pi.
Proof: At the end of the algorithm, U(q) as returned
is a Nash equilibrium with none having any incentives to
deviate:
1) For i, σi(U(q)) > τi(U(q)). For any j ∈ Ai,
σi(U(q)) < τi(U(q)). By the axioms, it achieves the
best possible power allocation outcome induced by
U(q) and therefore has no incentives to deviate.
2) For any adversary of i, j ∈ Ai, σj(U(q)) < τj(U(q)).
They cannot deviate in any way to strictly improve the
power allocation outcome.
3) For any other country, j ∈ n \ {i} ∪ Ai, σj(U(q)) ≥
τj(U(q)) and ∀k ∈ Aj , σj(U(q)) ≤ τj(U(q)). They
also achieve the best possible power allocation out-
come, and thus do not have incentives to deviate.
IV. UNIQUE PREDICTIONS FOR SURVIVAL
A. Domination and Protectorate
In certain environments, the PAG can have unique pre-
dictions for countries’ survival. As part of formalizing those
conditions for these environments, the notions of “domina-
tion” and “protectorate” will first be introduced. A concept
of “domination-protectorate cover” will then be discussed
and used for establishing the conditions for the PAG to have
these unique predictions for countries’ survival.
Domination: In an environment graph GE = (V , EE)
that represent the set of countries and their relations in an
environment, if for country i ∈ n, there holds
pi ≥
∑
j∈Ai
pj +
∑
k∈
⋃
j∈Ai
Fj
pk,
we call the set
Di = {i} ∪ Ai ∪
⋃
j∈Ai
Fj
country i’s domination, which includes itself, its adversaries,
and the friends of its adversaries.
Protectorate: In an environment graph GE = (V , EE)
that represent the set of countries and their relations in an
environment, let
Ξi =

j ∈ Fi : pj <
∑
k∈Aj
pk


be the friends of country i ∈ n whose total power is smaller
than that of its adversaries and
Θi =
⋃
j∈Ξi
Aj
be the set of adversaries of this particular set of friends. If
pi +
∑
j∈Ξi
pi ≥
∑
j∈Ai∪Θi
pj ,
we call the set
Pi = Fi ∪ {i}
country i’s protectorate, which includes itself and all its
friends who can defend themselves either with their own
power or with that of i.
Since environments without any friend relations are de-
generate versions of those with both adversary and friend
relations, the definitions of domination would be essentially
the same in both cases, where the only difference is that
a country’s domination in the latter case would cover the
friends of its foes. The definition of protectorate in envi-
ronments with both adversary and friend relations would
actually be the same with that of domination in environments
with only adversary relations.
Domination-Protectorate Cover: In an environment graph
GE = (V , EE), the collection of dominations and protec-
torates
Q =
⋃
i∈n
(Di ∪ Pi)
is a domination-protectorate cover of graph GE .
If the domination-protectorate cover spans the whole
graph, which means
Q =
⋃
i∈n
(Di ∪ Pi) = n,
the PAG on this graph will have a unique prediction for a
country’s survival, with the reasoning being that the predic-
tion for any country’s survival in the game can be locally
and uniquely determined within each possible domination or
protectorate. This reasoning is now illustrated with the below
Example 4 and Theorem 6.
Example 4: The networked environment in which the PAG
takes place is characterized by the following parameters:
1) Set of countries (labels): n = {1, 2, 3, 4}
2) Countries’ total power: p = [p1, p2, p3, p4] =
[1, 2, 1, 20].
3) Countries’ relations: A1 = {2}, A3 = {4}, F2 =
{3}, and all other possible pairs of countries have no
relations.
4) Countries’ preferences: Assume the two axioms.
Figure 4 shows a domination-protectorate cover that spans
the whole graph GE . D2 + D4 = n. The respective PAG
only has a unique equilibrium class, where countries 2 and
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Fig. 4: D-P Cover Spanning the Graph
4 survive (with their states being safe here), and countries 1
and 3 do not (with their states being unsafe here).
Theorem 6 (Unique Prediction for Survival): The PAG
Γ = {C, p,U , σi, τi,X ,} can uniquely predict a country’s
survival if its domination-protectorate cover spans the whole
graph G. In other words, if Q = n and there exists a
U∗ ∈ U∗ in which for a country i ∈ n, σi(U
∗) > τi(U
∗)
(or σi(U
∗) < τi(U
∗)), there does not exist V ∗ ∈ U∗ in
which σi(U
∗) < τi(U
∗) (or σi(U
∗) > τi(U
∗)).
Proof: If a domination-protectorate cover spans the whole
graph GE , country i is either in a domination, i.e., dom-
inating others or being dominated by others, or is in a
protectorate. If country i’s domination Di 6= ∅ and If i is in
a protectorate Pi, then for all j ∈ Pi, σj(U∗) ≥ τj(U∗) for
any U∗ ∈ U∗. Therefore, if there exists a U∗ ∈ U∗ in which
for a country i ∈ n, σi(U∗) > τi(U∗) (σi(U∗) < τi(U∗)),
there does not exist U∗ ∈ U∗ in which σi(U∗) < τi(U∗)
(σi(U
∗) > τi(U
∗)). Thus, any country’s survival can be
uniquely determined.
V. CONCLUSION
This is apparently the first paper to study the countries’
survival problem in a networked international environment.
One direction of future work is to explore the environments
in which a country can not just survive itself but also
“succeed” in the PAG. This would go beyond the two axioms
to a total order of the state space (and a corresponding utility
function representation of countries’ preferences) in order to
rigorously define a country’s “success”. Another direction is
to apply the theory of equilibrium selection to the PAG in
our countries’ survival problem. For instance, in a PAG with
multiple Nash Equilibria, can countries always manage to
“select” those equilibria in which they survive?
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